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ROSENBLUM, INC V ADLER: CPAs LIABLE AT
COMMON LAW TO CERTAIN REASONABLY
FORESEEABLE THIRD PARTIES WHO
DETRIMENTALLY RELY ON NEGLIGENTLY AUDITED
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler t be-
came the first court in the United States2 to hold certified public ac-
countants (CPAs) liable at common law3 to certain reasonably
foreseeable third parties4 who detrimentally rely on negligently5 audited
1 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
2 Since 1980, England has held accountants liable to reasonably foreseeable third par-
ties who detrimentally rely on negligently audited financial statements. In JEB Fasteners
Ltd. v. Marks, Bloom & Co., [1981] 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.), aj'd, [1983] 1 All E.R. 583 (C.A.),
the defendant accounting firm negligently audited the financial statements of a manufactur-
ing company. The plaintiff, JEB Fasteners, later acquired the financially troubled manufac-
turer. The plaintiff subsequently discovered that the audited financial statements of the
manufacturing company significantly overstated the company's net worth. JEB Fasteners
sued the manufacturer's auditors for negligence. The court held that accountants are liable
to all reasonably foreseeable third parties, such as the plaintiff, for negligently conducting an
audit. Id. at 300-01. The court, however, granted judgment for the defendant auditors be-
cause their negligence did not cause plaintiff's losses. Evidence indicated that the plaintiff
would have acquired the manufacturer even if it had known of the financial misstatement.
Id. at 304-05.
For a discussion of this case by English commentators, see Stanton & Dugdale, Recent
Developments in Professional Negligence - If- Accountant's Liability to Third Parties, 132 NEw L.J. 4
(1982).
3 This Note does not analyze in detail auditors' legal liability to third parties under
federal securities laws. A brief discussion of this statutory liability, however, is useful for
comparative purposes.
Under the Securities Act of 1933, accountants are liable for negligence to third parties
who purchase newly issued securities if the financial section of the registration statement re-
quired to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is materially mislead-
ing. Securities Act of 1933, § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77(k) (1982). Under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)(b) (1982), mere negligence in the presentation of
annual reports and other documents required to be filed under the 1934 Act has been held
insufficient to state a claim against a CPA. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201
(1976) (to hold CPA liable under the 1934 Act, CPA must have scienter or intent to deceive
and manipulate). Accountants are liable under the 1934 Act for recklessness to third parties
who buy or sell securities if the financial section of the annual report required to be filed with
the SEC is materially misleading. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1084 (D. Del.
1976) (liability of accountant who had prepared opinion audit under antifraud provision of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 could properly attach upon a showing of reckless disregard of
truth).
4 The New Jersey court did not create an all-inclusive list of what third parties are
"reasonably foreseeable." The scope of this class will differ somewhat depending on the na-
ture of the audited client's business. For example, the reasonably foreseeable users of a manu-
facturing company's financial statements may include suppliers of inventory who sell
inventory to the company on credit, or others who factor the company's accounts receivable.
Those types of third party users of financial statements, however, would probably not be
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financial statements. 6 Even though the principal effect of the auditor's
opinion to management about the accuracy of the examined financial
statements 7 is to influence third parties,8 prior to Rosenblum all state
courts severely limited the rights of third parties against negligent CPAs.
A minority of state courts still precludes all third parties from suing
CPAs for negligence, holding that a CPA's legal duty extends only to
those with whom he is in privity.9 The majority of state courts allows
only specifically known or intended third party users or classes of users
of financial statements' 0 to sue CPAs for negligent auditing.
The New Jersey ruling is a rational extension of the rights of third
parties against negligent CPAs.' 2 This state now provides the primary
users of audited financial statements, including stockholders, investors,
and creditors,' 3 with increased access to its courts to recover economic
losses sustained as a result of CPA negligence. The well-reasoned Rosen-
blum decision should provide the impetus for other states to modernize' 4
reasonably foreseeable in the case of a bank or financial institution. At a minimum, the New
Jersey court includes "stockholders, potential investors, creditors and potential creditors" as
reasonably foreseeable third parties. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 332, 461 A.2d at 142.
The CPA, of course, is liable at common law to his client for negligence, see id. at 333,
461 A.2d at 142, and to third parties for fraudulent conduct, see injfa note 27.
5 This Note is concerned with negligence, not recklessness. Many courts already hold
CPAs liable at common law to third parties for recklessness. See Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 349, 461
A.2d at 151.
6 See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text (discussing auditing and financial
statements).
7 See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing auditor's opinions).
8 See Comment, Auditors' Responsibility For Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection For Users
of Financial Statements, 44 WASH. L. REV. 139, 178 (1968) (audit evaluates "the adequacy and
fairness of financial statements issued by management to shareholders, creditors, and others");
see also infra note 40.
9 See, e.g., Investors Tax Sheltered Real Estate, Ltd. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath
& Horwath, 370 So. 2d 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (accounting firm cannot be held liable
to investing enterprise for negligence when there is no privity); cf. MacNerland v. Barnes, 129
Ga. App. 367, 199 S.E.2d 564 (1973) (accountant not liable for negligence regarding uncerti-
fled financial statement to third parties who are not in privity, even though he knew of or
could have anticipated reliance). For other cases with similar holdings, see Annot., 46
A.L.R.3d 979, 991-94 (1972).
10 See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text for definition of "known or intended"
third party users or classes of users of financial statements.
I1 See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968) (applying Rhode
Island state law) (CPAs liable to third party banking and factoring corporation they knew
would rely on negligently audited financial statements in extending credit); Ryan v. Kanne,
170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969) (CPAs liable to third parties they knew would rely on negli-
gently determined accounts payable information); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. James, 466
S.W.2d 873 ('ex. Civ. App. 1971) (accountant owed duty of care to creditor to whom he
knew audit would be given). For other cases with similar holdings, see Annot., supra note 9, at
989-91.
12 See Note, The Enlarging Scope of Auditors' Liability to Rel ing Third Parties, 59 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 281, 295-96 (1984) (concluding that privity rule is anachronistic and that
Rosenblum rule is workable alternative).
13 See infa note 40.
14 The "reasonably foreseeable" standard adopted in Rosenblum to define the scope of a
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their view of the legal duty and liability of auditors to third parties. 15
I
ACCOUNTANTS AND AUDITING OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
In the typical audit engagement, financial statements prepared by
a company's management are examined, tested, and reviewed by in-
dependent CPAs. This independent testing is intended to ensure that
financial statements provide reasonably complete, accurate, and unbi-
ased information. The availability of such reliable information is essen-
tial to the efficient functioning of a free market economy. Unreliable
information misleads decision makers and causes inefficient use and al-
location of scarce resources. 16
A CPA must conduct an audit in accordance with "generally ac-
cepted auditing standards" (GAAS). 17 The membership of the Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants has approved and adopted
CPA's duty is "already applied as an integral part of general negligence law." Note, supra
note 12, at 295. A possible reason that the law of accountants' negligence has lagged behind
general negligence law in this respect is the nature of accountants' negligence claims. In cases
of accountants' negligence, the CPA is usually neither the only nor the primary wrongdoer.
He is usually only a secondary wrongdoer because he has failed, by his negligence, to detect
the fraud of his client. See, e.g., Rosenblum, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (auditor allegedly negli-
gent, but client fraudulent). The fact that CPAs are usually only secondary wrongdoers does
not justify circumscribing their negligence liability.
It must be remembered that one of the specific functions for which the ac-
countant is employed is the detection of corporate fraud. Accountants and
accounting firms derive substantial economic benefit because of their abilities
in this regard. It hardly seems oppressive to require that they perform this
task in a professionally reasonable manner.
Wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent Misrepresentation, 20
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 233, 258 (1983).
A more common rationale for circumscribing accountants' liability for their negligence is
the fear of exposing them to unlimited liability. See inra notes 29, 32 & 33 and accompanying
text.
15 Another state, Wisconsin, has adopted a foreseeability standard. In Citizens State
Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983), a bank sued an
accounting firm and its malpractice insurer for losses it allegedly incurred when it loaned
money to the auditor's corporate client in reliance on financial statements that were negli-
gently audited. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed a lower court's grant of summary
judgment for the auditors and remanded the case to the trial court on the negligence claim.
The supreme court noted that the absence of privity should not bar such a claim. It then
addressed the question of the extent to which CPAs should be liable to third parties for negli-
gence. Citing Rosenblum, decided less than a month earlier, the Wisconsin court noted that
even the Restatement (Second) of Torts position, that negligent CPAs are liable to individually
known or intended third party users of financial statements and members of a known or
intended class of users of such statements, see infia notes 34-41 and accompanying text, was
"too restrictive a statement of policy factors for this Court to adopt." 113 Wis. 2d at 386, 335
N.W.2d at 366 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that CPAs will be liable, in Wiscon-
sin, for negligence to all reasonably foreseeable third parties, unless the CPAs prove at trial
that public policy requires another outcome. Id.
16 A. ARENS & J. LOEBBEcKE, AUDITING: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 2 (1976).
17 See 2 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA PROFES-
SIONAL STANDARDS ET § 202.01 (1981) [hereinafter cited as AICPA].
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ten generally accepted auditing standards that set broad guidelines for
CPA audit conduct:
General Standards
1. The examination is to be performed by a person or persons hav-
ing adequate technical training and proficiency as an auditor.
2. In all matters relating to the assignment, an independence in
mental attitude is to be maintained by the auditor or auditors.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the performance of the
examination and the preparation of the report.
Standards of Field Work
1. The work is to be adequately planned and assistants, if any, are to
be properly supervised.
2. There is to be a proper study and evaluation of the existing inter-
nal control as a basis for reliance thereon and for the determination of
the resultant extent of the tests to which auditing procedures are to be
restricted.
3. Sufficient competent evidential matter is to be obtained through
inspection, observation, inquiries, and confirmations to afford a rea-
sonable basis for an opinion regarding the financial statements under
examination.
Standards of Reporting
1. The report shall state whether the financial statements are
presented in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles.
2. The report shall state whether such principles have been consist-
ently observed in the current period in relation to the preceding
period.
3. Informative disclosures in the financial statements are to be re-
garded as reasonably adequate unless otherwise stated in the report.
4. The report shall either contain an expression of opinion regarding
the financial statements, taken as a whole, or an assertion to the effect
that an opinion cannot be expressed. When an overall opinion cannot
be expressed, the reasons therefor should be stated. In all cases where
an auditor's name is associated with financial statements, the report
should contain a clear-cut indication of the character of the auditor's
examination, if any, and the degree of responsibility he is taking.1 8
After conducting an audit conforming to GAAS, the CPA expresses
his professional opinion about the accuracy of the examined financial
statements in a written report that accompanies the financial state-
18 See 1 AICPA, supra note 17, AU § 150.02.
The AICPA also frequently issues Statements on Auditing Standards, which are detailed
interpretations of GAAS. A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 16, at 40. CPAs must com-
ply with these Statements in conducting an audit in order to conform to GAAS. 2 AICPA,
supra note 17, ET § 202.01. "[rmhese AICPA pronouncements should be looked upon by prac-
titioners as minimum standards of performance rather than as maximum standards or ideals.
Any professional auditor who [relies] only on the standards ... fails to satisfy the spirit of the
standards." A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 16, at 40 (emphasis in original).
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ments. The CPA's report usually takes the form of an "unqualified
opinion," stating that the CPA performed his examination in accord-
ance with GAAS and that the financial statements are fairly presented
in conformity with "generally accepted accounting principles"
(GAAP). 19 If the auditor conducts an audit conforming to GAAS and
believes that the overall financial statements are fairly presented in ac-
cordance with GAAP, with some specific exceptions, he should issue a
"qualified opinion." If the auditor conducts an audit conforming to
GAAS and believes that the financial statements are not fairly presented
in accordance with GAAP, he should issue an "adverse opinion." Fi-
nally, if the auditor cannot satisfy himself whether the financial state-
ments are or are not fairly presented in accordance with GAAP, he
should issue a "disclaimer of opinion. '20
The auditor's report "normally forms the basis for any assertion of
liability against [the CPA]," 2 I because the report usually contains repre-
sentations that he has conducted the audit in accordance with GAAS
and that the financial statements are presented in accordance with
GAAP. An auditor meets the standard of a "reasonable CPA" when he
performs audits in accordance with GAAS and presents financial state-
ments in accordance with GAAP. 22 When a CPA fails to act as a "rea-
sonable CPA," he has acted negligently and courts may subject him to
legal liability. Conversely, "courts generally hold that an accountant
will not be liable if his work conforms to the applicable GAAP and
GAAS and the financial statement is informative. '23
19 See A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 16, at 41-43. "Generally accepted account-
ing principles" are the rules, conventions, and procedures of financial reporting, as defined by
the accounting profession's standard-setting body, currently the Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board. See id. at 45 for further discussion of GAAP.
20 See id. at 43-45. For a discussion of the rare situations warranting disclaimer by the
CPA, see id. at 649-50.
For an example of an unqualified opinion, see in/fa note 50. For a detailed discussion of
the various types of auditors' reports, see A. ARENS &J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 16, at 643-63.
For a thumbnail sketch of auditing procedures, see Fiflis, Current Problems ofAccountants'Respon-
sibilities to Third Parties, 28 VAND. L. REv. 31, 35-42 (1975).
21 Wiener, supra note 14, at 237.
22 Bloch, Inc. v. Klein, 45 Misc. 2d 1054, 1057, 258 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1965) ("certified public accountant ...must exercise the care and competence reasonably
expected of persons in his profession"); Shahmoon v. General Dev. Corp., FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 94308, at 95,039 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (generally liability will not attach when audit
conforms "with generally accepted accounting procedures as that term is understood by at
least a majority of accounting experts"); see in/fa note 23.
23 Volz, Accountant's Liability to Third Persons: Resistance in Negligence, 9 BARRISTER 31, 33
(Fall 1982). See generaly Adams, Lessening the Legal Liability of Auditors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1037,
1046-47 (1967) (fulfillment of professional standards generally suffices to show absence of neg-
ligence although the trend may be toward requiring more than mere technical competence);
Fiflis, supra note 20, at 62-87 (professional standards are an important factor, but compliance
may be insufficient to insulate accountants from liability for negligence); Solomon, Ultramares
Revisited. A Modem Study ofAccountants'Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAUL L. REv. 56, 58 (1968)
(CPAs must act as a "reasonable CPA" would to avoid charges of negligence). Obviously, in
1985]
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II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF CPA LIABILITY TO THIRD
PARTIES
A. The Doctrine of Ultramares v. Touche
The landmark opinion regarding CPA liability to third parties is
the New York Court of Appeals decision in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Niven & Co.24 In UItramares, the plaintiff, a factoring corporation, made
loans to Fred Stern & Company (Stern) in reliance on25 Stern's balance
sheet and the auditors' certificate26 accompanying it. Although Stern
was actually insolvent, one of the balance sheets Ultramares relied on
indicated Stem's net worth as over $1,000,000. This overstatement of
net worth occurred because a Stern employee had recorded fraudulent
sales and accounts receivable in the company's accounting records. Ul-
tramares, realizing that its loans to Stern were now uncollectible, sued
Stern's independent auditors, Touche, Niven & Co. (Touche), for fraud
and negligence.
Chief Judge Cardozo reversed the lower court's dismissal of the
fraud claim and ordered a new trial on that claim. He denied the plain-
tiff recovery on the negligence claim, however, even though he found
that the auditors were negligent and that they knew creditors such as
Ultramares would rely on the certified balance sheets. Ultramares could
not sue Touche for negligence, Cardozo reasoned, because it was not in
privity with the CPA firm. 27 Cardozo noted that "[t]he assault upon the
an audit, it is not reasonable to expect the CPA to examine and test every transaction a client
company makes. This task would be insurmountable in most audit engagements due to the
volume of companies' transactions each year. Therefore, the auditor must issue his audit
report based on something less than a complete examination of every transaction. Due to this
inherent limitation in the auditing process, "the auditor is not an insurer or a guarantor of the
fairness of [financial statements] . . . ." A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 16, at 18; see
also Solomon, supra, at 89 ("It is clear that the CPA should not be made a guarantor of the
absolute accuracy of the financial statements he certifies .... ") (footnote omitted); Rosen-
blum, 93 N.J. at 344, 461 A.2d at 148 (auditor's review is subject to constraints because he is
neither required to investigate every supporting document nor deemed to have the training of
a criminal investigator).
24 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) (Cardozo, CJ.) (unanimous decision).
25 Indeed, receipt of Stem's certified balance sheet was a condition precedent to the
loans by Ultramares. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 443.
26 The auditors' certificate in Ultramares stated that the balance sheet "presents a true
and correct view of the financial condition" of Stern. Id. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442. Compare
this language with the auditors' unqualified opinion in Rosenblum, infra note 50.
27 Cardozo wrote:
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the consequences of
fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so negligent as to justify
a finding that they had no genuine belief in its adequacy, for this again is
fraud. It does no more than say that, if less than this is proved, if there has
been neither reckless misstatement nor insincere profession of an opinion, but
only honest blunder, the ensuing liability for negligence is one that is
bounded by the contract, and is to be enforced between the parties by whom
the contract has been made. We doubt whether the average business man
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citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace" 28 and stated:
If liability for negligence [to third parties] exists, a thoughtless slip or
blunder, the failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of
deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeter-
minate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.
The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as
to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a
duty that exposes [auditors] to these consequences. 2 9
Courts30 and legal commentators3t have criticized the Ultramares
receiving a certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely as one
among a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything more.
Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
Compare Cardozo's conclusion regarding "honest blunders" in Ultramares with that
reached by Dean Prosser. "An honest blunder ... may absolve [the defendant] from moral
blame, but the harm to others is still as great, and the actor's individual standards must give
way to those of the public." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 146 (4th ed.
1971) (footnote omitted).
One commentator believes that Ultramares did not limit a CPA's liability for negligence
to those in privity. Rather, he postulates that the court in Ultramares held that a CPA can be
sued for negligence by the "primary beneficiaries" of the audit, but that these beneficiaries
are usually those in privity with the CPA. Regardless of the correct interpretation, the com-
mentator notes that Ultramares is frequently cited by courts as limiting CPA liability to those
with whom he is in privity. Fiflis, supra note 20, at 105.
It is intriguing to compare Cardozo's language in Ultramares with his language in the
earlier landmark decision, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916). In MacPherson, Cardozo allowed the purchaser of a defective automobile to recover
from the manufacturer despite the lack of privity, reasoning that:
The contractor who builds the scaffold invites the owner's workmen to use it.
The manufacturer who sells the automobile to the retail dealer invites the
dealer's customers to use it. The invitation is addressed in the one case to
determinate persons and in the other to an indeterminate class, but in each
case it is equally plain, and in each its consequences must be the same.
There is nothing anomalous in a rule which .imposes upon A., who has
contracted with B., a duty to C. and D. and others according as he knows or
does not know that the subject-matter of the contract is intended for their use.
Id. at 393, 111 N.E. at 1054 (emphasis added).
In explaining the contradiction between Ultramares and MacPherson, one commentator
hypothesizes that Cardozo believed that the plaintiffs in Ultramares would surely succeed
against the auditors on the fraud claim, so he found it unnecessary to fashion a rule that
would permit them recovery on the alternative theory of negligence. Solomon, supra note 23,
at 72. Cardozo himself suggested an obvious, if illogical, distinction between the two ap-
proaches. He believed that financial loss incurred through reliance on negligently published
words need not give rise to the same liability as an act or omission setting in motion a physical
force causing personal injury. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 181, 174 N.E. at 445.
28 Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445.
29 Id at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444.
30 See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-91 (D.R.I. 1968) (Ultramares
decision is an "unwarranted inroad" upon established use of foreseeability as defining the
scope of one's duty to others); Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378,
383 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) ("[R]ejection of the requirement of the strict rule of privity in this
case comports with the concepts of the functions and duties of the modern public accountant
31 See, e.g., Besser, Prioity?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Par-
ties, 7 SE;TON HALL L. REV. 507, 541-42 (1976) (accountants' duty should expand to corre-
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doctrine for unreasonably insulating negligent CPAs from liability to
injured third parties. Ultramares remains the law in a minority of juris-
dictions today,32 however, because some courts still fear that any other
standard would lead to almost unlimited liability for CPAs.33
B. The Erosion of the Doctrine of Ultramares v. Touche
A majority of courts soon became dissatisfied with the restrictive
Ultramares doctrine and abandoned it. These courts replaced the U-
tramares doctrine with the rule of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.3 4 The
Restatement provides that negligent CPAs are liable to individually
known or intended third party users of financial statements, and to third
parties who are not individually known or intended but are members of
a known or intended class of users of financial statements.3 5 For there to
be a "known or intended" third party or class of third parties, however,
the CPA must be explicitly informed 36 that the third party or class of
spond to their expanded functions); Fiflis, supra note 20, at 107 (Ultramares obsolete because of
current public service status of accountants); Solomon, supra note 23, at 73 (arguing that
Cardozo was imprecise when he asserted that services rendered by public accountants are
primarily for benefit of client and that they are "public" only in sense that they offer their
services to anyone who chooses to employ them); Wiener, supra note 14, at 249-53 (privity
requirement does not account for important function CPAs fulfill in economy); Note, Account-
ants' Liability for Negligence-A Contemporay Approach for a Modern Profession, 48 FORDHAM L.
REv. 401 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Accountants' Liability] (privity shield is no longer appro-
priate because audits are more sophisticated and policy goals of products liability laws are
similar to those for accountants' liability laws); Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence
and the Third Party, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 588, 604-07 (1972) (discussing policy reasons for
extension of liability).
32 See supra note 9 and accompanying text for a sampling of these jurisdictions.
33 Stephens Indus. v. Haskins & Sells, 438 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971) (applying Colorado
law) (accountants not liable for negligence to third party absent privity); Investment Corp. of
Fla. v. Buchman, 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. App.), cert. dismssed, 216 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1968); see supra
note 9 (citing other cases). "When the harm. . . caused [by negligent auditing] is only pecu-
niary loss, the courts have found it necessary to adopt a more restricted rule of liability [i.e.,
the Ultramares rule], because of the extent to which misinformation may be . . . circulated,
and the magnitude of the losses which may follow from reliance upon it." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 comment a (1977).
34 See supra note 11 and accompanying text for a sampling of these jurisdictions.
35 The relevant Restatement (Second) position reads in part as follows:
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others
(1) One who, in the course of his. . . profession . . . supplies false informa-
tion for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to lia-
bility for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the
information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care of competence in obtaining
or communicating the information.
(2) [T~he liability stated in Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose benefit
and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows that the recipient
intends to supply it . ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977).
36 Neither the Restatement (Second) nor the courts have addressed the issue of whether
only the client can inform the CPA of the existence of a contemplated third party user of the
financial statements, or whether it is sufficient that the third party alone inform the CPA that
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third parties will use the client's audited financial statements. For ex-
ample, where a CPA's client expressly informs the auditor, before the
audit is completed, that he will be using the statements to negotiate a
bank loan, the CPA is liable to a bank that detrimentally relies on negli-
gently audited financial statements in extending credit to the CPA's cli-
ent, because the bank is a member of a "known or intended" class of
third parties.37 The Restatement (Second) requires that the client specifi-
cally inform the auditor of third parties that intend to use the financial
statements even if the auditor "knows that the financial statements...
are customarily used in a wide variety of financial transactions by the cor-
poration and that they may be relied upon by lenders, investors, shareholders,
creditors, [and] purchasers . . . in numerous possible kinds of
transactions. 38
Therefore, despite the role of the auditor in ensuring the availabil-
ity of reliable information in today's economy,39 and despite the typical
uses made of audited financial statements,40 almost all third party users
of financial statements are precluded from suing negligent CPAs at com-
mon law. In most cases, stockholders, creditors, and other third parties
are merely "reasonably foreseeable" third parties, not "known or in-
tended" ones,41 and they, therefore, remain unprotected by the Restate-
ment (Second) or by Ultramares.
This was the status of the law of accountants' liability for negli-
gence to third parties in 1983, when the New Jersey Supreme Court was
confronted with the case of Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler.
it will be receiving the financial statements from the client. Although the Restatement (Second)
does not explicitly address this issue, the illustrations set forth in the comment to § 552 all
have the client informing the CPA.
37 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 illustration 7 (1977).
38 See id. § 552 illustration 10 (emphasis added).
39 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
40 "It is now well recognized that the audited statements are made for the use of third
parties who have no contractual relationship with the auditor. Moreover, it is common
knowledge that companies use audits for many proper business purposes [involving third par-
ties]." Rosenblum, 93 NJ. at 345, 461 A.2d at 149. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 218 (1976) (dissenting opinion) ("The critical importance of the auditing account-
ant's role . . . cannot be overestimated . . . . [T]he accountant's duty 'is to safeguard the
public interest, not that of his client.' ") (quoting In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37
S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957)); Solomon, supra note 23, at 74 ("[T]o say that the primary utility
derived from the independent accountant's report and statements rests with third parties,
such as suppliers, credit lenders, potential and present investors, and financial analysts is cer-
tainly no great overstatement."). For an argument that even under Ultramares it is possible
that CPAs are liable to third parties for negligence, if third parties are the "primary benefi-
ciaries" of an auditor's examination, see Fiflis, supra note 20, at 105.
41 For example, as one court pointed out, the plaintiff factoring corporation in Ut-
Iramares was a third party that was "not actually foreseen but only foreseeable." Rusch Fac-
tors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 91 (D.R.I. 1968).
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III
THE CASE
Harry and Barry Rosenblum executed an agreement on March 9,
1972, to sell their retail catalog businesses to Giant Department Stores
(Giant), a publicly held corporation that owned and operated discount
department stores, art and gift shops, and retail catalog showrooms. 42
In exchange for their businesses, the Rosenblums received Giant com-
mon stock.4 3
Approximately one year after the Rosenblums received their stock,
it was discovered that Giant's management had fraudulently prepared
the company's financial statements for fiscal years 1971 and 1972.
4 4
Management had manipulated Giant's accounts by recording assets not
owned and by failing to record liabilities incurred, thereby inflating the
company's net worth.45 The American Stock Exchange immediately
suspended trading in Giant's stock and trading never resumed. 46 By the
time Giant filed for bankruptcy in September of 1973, the stock of Giant
held by Harry and Barry Rosenblum had become worthless. 47
Touche Ross & Co. (Touche), a prominent accounting firm,48 had
been Giant's independent auditor since the company became publicly
held in 1969.4 9 More recently, Touche had audited Giant's fiscal year
1971 and 1972 financial statements and had issued unqualified opin-
ions50 as to both years' statements. Touche's audits did not uncover the
42 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 329-30, 461 A.2d at 140-41.
43 Id. at 331, 461 A.2d at 141.
44 Id.
45 Id
46 Id
47 Id
48 Touche Ross & Co. is one of the nation's "Big Eight" CPA firms. See infra note 93.
Coincidently, Touche Ross & Co. was formerly Touche, Niven & Co., the auditor involved in
Ultramares. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
49 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 329-30, 461 A.2d at 140.
50 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. The relevant portion of the opinion
issued by Touche Ross in connection with the 1972 audit of Giant Stores reads:
We have examined the accompanying consolidated balance sheet of Giant
Stores Corp. and wholly-owned subsidiaries as of January 29, 1972 and Janu-
ary 30, 1971, and the related statements of earnings, stockholders' equity and
changes in financial position for the years (52 weeks) then ended. Our exami-
nation was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards,
and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and such other
auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
In our opinion, the consolidated financial statements referred to above pre-
sent fairly the financial position of Giant Stores Corp. and wholly-owned sub-
sidiaries at January 29, 1972 and January 30, 1971, the results of their
operations and changes in the financial position for the years (52 weeks) then
ended, in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles applied
on a consistent basis.
GIANT STORES CORPORATION, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT 19 (1972). A similar opinion was is-
sued for the 1971 audit. See Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 330, 461 A.2d at 141.
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management fraud at Giant.51
The Rosenblums sued Touche5 2 for the fiscal year 1971 and 1972
audits, charging the accounting firm with fraudulent misrepresentation,
gross negligence, negligence, and breach of warranty for each audit.53
The Rosenblums further alleged that Touche's misconduct was the
proximate cause of their financial loss because they relied on Giant's
audited statements in their merger dealings with Giant.
At trial, Touche moved to dismiss the negligence claim for the fiscal
1971 audit, and the court granted that motion. Touche also moved to
dismiss the negligence, gross negligence, and fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion claims for the fiscal 1972 audit, but the court denied that motion.54
The New Jersey Superior Court affirmed both trial court rulings, 55 and
Touche and the Rosenblums appealed. The New Jersey Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim for the 1971 audit and
affirmed the denial of summary judgment for Touche for the 1972 au-
dit.56 The supreme court held that when an independent auditor issues
an opinion concerning certain financial statements and does not limit
the dissemination of the attached financial statements, he has a legal
duty to all reasonably foreseeable5 7 third parties who rely on the state-
ments received from the company for "a proper business purpose. 583
The court rejected the limitations on accountants' third party liability
imposed by Ultramares59 and the Restatement (Second)60 because " '[t]he
accountant, the investor and the general public will in the long run ben-
51 Of course, it is not normally the auditor's duty to detect fraud. "An examination
made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards cannot be expected to pro-
vide assurance that illegal [client] acts will be detected." 1 AICPA, supra note 17, AU
§ 328.03 (footnote omitted). "Nonetheless, the independent auditor should be expected to
detect illegal or improper acts that would be uncovered in the exercise of normal professional
skill and care." Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 344, 461 A.2d at 148.
52 The Rosenblums sued Jack F. Adler and 426 others, individually and as partners
trading as Touche Ross & Co., severally, and in the alternative. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 324, 461
A.2d at 138.
53 Id. at 332, 461 A.2d at 141.
-54 Id at 332, 461 A.2d at 141-42.
55 Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 183 N.J. Super. 417,444 A.2d 66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1982). The lower courts dismissed the claims regarding the 1971 audit because that audit was
completed on April 16, 1971, and Giant's merger discussions with the Rosenblums did not
begin until September 1971. Because the accountants did not know of the plaintiffs when
they prepared the 1971 audit report, the lower courts held that the accountants could not be
liable to the plaintiffs under either Ultramares or the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Rosenblum, 93
N.J. at 353, 461 A.2d at 153-54.
The lower courts did not dismiss the claims regarding the 1972 audit; that audit was not
finished until after Giant and the Rosenblums started their merger discussions. Id. at 356-57,
461 A.2d at 155.
56 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
57 See supra note 4.
58 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153.
59 See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
60 See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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efit when the liability of the certified public accountant for negligent
misrepresentation is measured by the foreseeability standard.' ",61
The Rosenblum court based its decision primarily on three public
policy reasons: least-cost avoidance, cost-spreading, and fairness.62
First, the court implied that the CPA is in a better position than the
third party to avoid the costs resulting from negligently performed au-
dits and the circulation of misleading financial information to the busi-
ness community. Were CPAs to "engage in more thorough reviews,"
they could "reduce the number of instances" of negligence.63 Second,
the court noted that large CPA firms have or can obtain extensive mal-
practice insurance coverage and can effectively spread the cost of those
premiums, as well as the cost of more extensive auditing review, to a
large group of people.64 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded
that, because of this ability to pass along some of the increased auditing
or insurance costs to others, CPAs would not be financially doomed by
the additional liability they would shoulder under the Rosenblum rule.65
61 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153 (quoting Wiener supra note 14, at 260).
62 It was necessary for the court to resort to public policy considerations because of the
lack of specific precedent in the United States for such a holding. See supra note 2 and accom-
panying text. The Rosenblum decision was not, however, completely without precedent. The
expansion of CPA liability to reasonably foreseeable third parties was in accord with develop-
ing principles of general negligence law. "The shift on the whole [in tort law] has been heav-
ily toward the side of the plaintiff, with expanded liability in nearly every area." W.
PROSSER, supra note 27, at XI. Indeed, "the conclusion may well be drawn that [foreseeabil-
ity] is on its way to ultimate victory as the criterion of what is 'proximate,' if it has not already
achieved it." Id. at 267.
Further, there was dictum in earlier American cases suggesting the expansion of CPA
liability undertaken by the Rosenblum court. See Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85,
91-93 (D.R.I. 1968) (distinguishing and criticizing Utramarer, suggesting that accountants
ought to bear the full cost of their negligence for efficiency and fairness reasons); Aluma Kraft
Mfg. Co. v. Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378, 381-83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (criticizing the
Ultramares holding and dispensing with strict rule of privity).
63 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152; see also id at 347, 461 A.2d at 150 (account-
ant's function " 'can eliminate the necessity for costly separate investigations by each party at
interest' ") (quoting In re Touche, Niven, Bailey & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 671 (1957)).
The belief that tort liability should be imposed on the party who can most easily avoid
the cost associated with negligent conduct is a dominant theme in tort literature. Seegeneral'y
G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF AccIDEm's 312 (1970) (recommending new system of accident
law that, inter alia, "begin[s] by allocating accident costs to those categories that can avoid
accidents most cheaply").
64 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152 ("Much of the additional costs incurred [by
CPAs] either because of more thorough auditing review or increased [CPA malpractice] in-
surance premiums would be borne by the business entity [being audited] and its stockholders
or its customers.").
65 The court found the reasonableness of this concern to be "questionable." Id. at 349,
461 A.2d at 151. "We have no reason to believe that [CPAs] may not purchase malpractice
insurance policies that cover [these] negligent acts .... " Id. In a footnote, the New Jersey
court noted that CPAs have obtained insurance to cover their potential liabilities under the
federal securities laws, which impose liability similar to that of Rosenblum. Id. at 349 n. 11, 461
A.2d at 151 n. 11. See supra note 3 for a discussion of CPAs' liability under the federal securi-
ties laws. In the same footnote, the court stated that "[a]t oral argument defendants con-
tended that the cost of insurance to cover the claims of all foreseeable users of audits would be
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Last, the court believed that, as a matter of fairness, negligent CPAs
should have a duty to and be liable for damages incurred by certain
innocent, reliant third parties.66
In assessing the impact that its opinion would have on the account-
ing profession, the Rosenblum court noted that "[t]he extent of financial
exposure has certain built-in limits. '67 First, the court stated that the
plaintiff suing the negligent CPA must receive the erroneous financial
statements "from the company pursuant to a proper company pur-
pose." 68 The court said that "an institutional investor or portfolio man-
ager who does not obtain audited [financial] statementsfrom the company
would not come within the stated principle. . . . Those and similar
cases beyond the stated rule are not before us and we express no opinion
with respect to such situations. ' 69 Second, the court stated that in mak-
ing the business decision that ultimately results in economic loss, the
plaintiff must reasonably rely on the financial statements.70 Third, the
court emphasized that the misstatement contained in the financial state-
ments must be due to the auditor's negligence and that the misstatement
must be the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.7' Next, the court
pointed out that the negligence, if any, of the injured plaintiff could bar
recovery or limit the amount ultimately recoverable from the negligent
CPA.72 Last, the court asserted that auditing firms may be able to seek
indemnification or contribution from their client company or the com-
pany's blameworthy officers or employees in those instances where both
the negligence of the CPA and of the client company contributed to the
misstatement of the financial statements and to the plaintiff's resultant
loss. 73
In concluding, the court remarked that "[c]ertified financial state-
ments have become the benchmark for various reasonably foreseeable
business purposes and accountants have been engaged to satisfy those
ends. . . . [A]ccounting firms [can] no longer . . . avoid liability for
their malpractice. The public interest will be served by the rule we pro-
mulgate this day."'74
catastrophic. Suffice it to say that defendants have not alerted us to data either within or
outside the record to support this position." Id. at 350 n.ll, 461 A.2d at 152 n.ll.
66 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 153. In formulating an expanded scope of duty
for accountants to third parties, the court said that " '[w]hether a duty exists is ultimately a
question of fairness."' Id. at 341, 461 A.2d at 147 (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth., 38
N.J. 578, 583, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (1962) (emphasis in original)).
67 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
68 Id
69 d at 352-53, 461 A.2d at 153 (emphasis added).
70 Id. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 350-51, 461 A.2d at 152.
73 Id at 351, 461 A.2d at 152.
74 Id at 353, 461 A.2d at 153.
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IV
ANALYSIS
A. Policy Reasons for Expanding CPA Liability to Reasonably
Foreseeable Third Parties
The three policy reasons for expanding CPA liability to the limits
of foreseeability (least-cost avoidance, cost-spreading, and fairness) are
not as persuasive as the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests. On bal-
ance, however, they do justify the extension of CPA liability formulated
by the court.
1. Least-Cost Avoidance
The court is correct in implying that, as between CPAs and reason-
ably foreseeable third parties, CPAs can most cheaply avoid the costs of
negligently audited financial statements. CPAs are intimately involved
in their client's annual audits and can avoid the costs associated with
negligent audits simply by performing higher quality audits.75 Inves-
tors, creditors, and other third parties cannot directly affect the accu-
racy of another's published financial statements by altering their
conduct or behavior. Two arguments can be made, however, that third
parties do have means available to protect themselves against negli-
gently audited and materially misleading financial statements. Never-
theless, these arguments are not persuasive in the face of Rosenblum's
"least cost avoidance" rationale.
The first argument is based on the so-called "efficient market" the-
ory of investment. One assumption of this theory is that all investors
have perfect and complete information with which to make their invest-
ment decisions. 76 Based on this assumption, proponents of the efficient
market theory, then, may hypothesize that investors are aware that fi-
75 See Besser, supra note 31, at 533 ("By adhering generally to the standards of the profes-
sion, an accountant will minimize the risk of loss to any possible plaintiff."). Further, by
extending CPA liability to reasonably foreseeable third parties, negligent auditing is made
more expensive and less attractive to CPAs. See generally G. CALABRESI, supra note 63, at 73-75
(deterrence, through expanded liability, "reduces accident costs [by]. . .encourag[ing] us to
make activities safer"). This creates a strong financial incentive for CPAs to perform more
competent examinations of financial statements and to reduce the incidence of negligence.
76 See T. DYCKMAN, D. DOWNES & R. MAGEE, EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND Ac-
COUNTING: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 4-5 (1975) (efficient market theory asserts that securities
prices reflect all available information about the issue); see also W. SHARPE, INVESTMENTS 97
(1978) ("The market is assumed to be efficient," and "[e]very investor is assumed to have the
same information [available to him].'); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theog
of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 257 (1977) ("[R]elatively obscure-even confiden-
tial-information is transmitted extremely swiftly and almost automatically affects share
price.') (citing J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET 70-97 (1973)). But see M.
FIRTH, THE VALUATION OF SHARES AND THE EFFICIENT-MARKETS THEORY 105-16 (1977)
(recognizing that no stock market is perfectly efficient because not all information is available
and because even if available such information may not be interpreted properly). For more
about the efficient market theory, see W. SHARPE, supra, at 23-24, 96-98.
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nancial statements may be materially misleading and that investors
know that they cannot generally recover their losses from negligent
CPAs.77 Therefore, it is argued that these knowledgable investors ac-
count for the risk of such unreimbursable losses by paying a lower price
for stocks or securities.
If the efficient market theory is correct, investors can partially pro-
tect themselves from potential losses due to auditor negligence by appro-
priately discounting the price they pay for stocks and securities. 78 This
theory, however, does not undercut the "least-cost avoidance" rationale
of Rosenblum; CPAs, experts at auditing, are still in the most efficient
position to ensure that audits are not negligently performed and that
financial statements are not materially misleading. The argument that
CPAs should not be liable for their negligence because some third par-
ties already may account for this risk by discounting the securities prices
they pay "is inconsistent with the general social policy . . . that risk of
loss should be imposed on the party best able to prevent its
occurence."
79
The second criticism of Rosenblum's "least cost avoidance" rationale
is the argument that third parties who expect to rely on audited finan-
cial statements for a transaction can protect themselves from losses due
to negligently audited and materially misstated financial statements by
asking that the client company have its CPAs issue a representation di-
rectly to the third party stating that the financial statements are accu-
rate. This representation would be similar to the "comfort letters"
CPAs issue to underwriters in large securities transactions.8 0 Thus,
under the Restatement (Second) standard,81 accountants would be liable
for negligent auditing to these third parties because they would be spe-
cifically "known or intended" third parties. Recourse against negligent
CPAs would still be unavailable, however, in jurisdictions requiring
77 See Winter, supra note 76, at 257 ("That the impact of a legal system on investors [is]
known only to law professors. . . seems a rather tenuous proposition.").
78 Presumably, creditors could likewise protect themselves by charging higher interest
rates.
79 Wiener, supra note 14, at 253 (footnote omitted). An additional weakness of the effi-
cient market theory as a means of protecting investors is that it is based on the concept of the
sophisticated investor. Not all investors, however, are institutions knowledgable enough to
protect themselves adequately against accountants' negligence. See id It would be anoma-
lous to argue that "the small [investor] in the stock market should be permitted recovery
[against CPAs], but on identical facts, the institutional investor [should] be denied that
right." Id. Indeed, "[a] rule of liability should not fluctuate depending upon the characteri-
zation of the plaintiff and the frequency, size or type of his investment. These considerations
are better left to the broader concern of whether contributory or comparative negligence
should bar or limit a plaintiff's recovery." Id. For a discussion of plaintiff's contributory or
comparative negligence, see infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
80 See generallo L. RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 10.25-10.33
(2d ed. 1966) (discussing comfort letters).
81 See sura notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
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privity, regardless of the representation. 82
This possibility for third party protection similarly fails to undercut
the "least-cost avoidance" rationale of Rosenblum. Even if some third
parties do have the foresight and ability to obtain comfort letters from
the CPA, the CPA is still the party best able to avoid negligent auditing
and its resultant costs.83
2. Cosl-Spreading
CPAs, especially large CPA firms, carry extensive malpractice in-
surance.84 The expansion of CPA liability to reasonably foreseeable
third parties will increase the cost of that insurance for auditors.8 5 The
costs of conducting an audit will also rise as CPAs perform more de-
tailed and expansive examinations of their clients' financial statements
in an effort to reduce the incidence of negligence.86 As the Rosenblum
court suggests, these initial increased costs will not fall completely on the
accounting firms themselves, but will be spread to the clients of the
firms.
8 7
The degree to which CPAs can pass these increased costs on to their
clients depends on the elasticity of demand 88 for and supply89 of CPAs'
auditing services. To the extent that such demand and supply are rela-
tively inelastic, much of the increased costs of insurance and additional
auditing can be passed on. To the extent that such demand and supply
82 See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
83 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. There is an additional limitation on this
procedure. In practice, this type of representation is issued only in conjunction with large
transactions, see L. RAPPAPORT, supra note 80, at 10.25-10.33, so the potential protection is
available only to a few large investors, not the myriad of small investors. As stated earlier, a
rule of liability should not depend on whether an investor is large or small. These concerns
are more properly viewed in conjunction with the plaintiffs potential contributory or com-
parative negligence. See Wiener, supra note 14, at 253. For a discussion of plaintiffs' contribu-
tory or comparative negligence, see infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.
84 For a discussion of CPA malpractice insurance, see Comment, Auditors' Third Party
Liability: An 1l/-Considered Extension of the Law, 46 WASH. L. REv. 675, 682-85 (1971).
85 See generalo id at 683-85 (noting changes in price and availability of insurance
coverage).
86 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
87 Id.
88 The elasticity of demand indicates the extent to which a percentage change in the
price of a good or service results in a percentage change in the quantity demanded of that
good or service. Generally, as the price of a good or service increases, the demand for that
good or service decreases. If a small change in price results in a large change in demand,
demand is relatively "elastic." If a large change in price results in a small change in demand,
demand is relatively "inelastic." See P. SAMUELSON, EcONOMIcS 380-81 (9th ed. 1973).
89 The elasticity of supply indicates the extent to which a percentage change in the price
of a good or service results in a percentage change in the quantity supplied of that good or
service. Generally, as the price of a good or service increases, the supply of that good or
service increases. If a small change in price results in a large change in supply, supply is
relatively "elastic." If a large change in price results in a small change in supply, supply is
relatively "inelastic." See id. at 384.
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are relatively elastic, however, CPAs will have to bear much of the in-
creased costs of insurance and additional auditing themselves.90
Among large publicly held companies, 91 the demand for CPA audit
services is inelastic because those companies are required by law to have
annual independent audits of their financial statements. 92 The supply
of CPA firms with the expertise and resources to perform audits of that
size and complexity is also relatively inelastic. 93 Therefore, most, if not
90 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 235 n.4 (2d ed. 1977) ("The amount of
passing on [of the increased costs of doing business] depends on the elasticity of demand. The
more elastic the demand, the less. . . will be passed on. . . ."). For an introductory discus-
sion of the concepts of supply, demand, and market elasticity, see R. LIPSEY & P. STEINER,
MICROECONOMIcs 53-68 (5th ed. 1979); R. POSNER, supra, at 196-97; P. SAMUELSON, supra
note 88, at 379-88.
91 This Note focuses on these large publicly held companies because auditing their fi-
nancial statements poses the greatest financial risk to negligent CPAs, due to the potential
number of third parties transacting business with the company and the size and frequency of
these transactions.
The analysis of cost passing between the CPA and the client corporation developed in
the text above is generally inapplicable where the client is a small, privately held corporation.
The number of CPA firms capable of auditing companies of this size is much larger than the
number of CPA firms capable of auditing large, publicly held corporations. Cf infra note 93
and accompanying text (discussing domination of business of auditing large publicly held
companies by "Big Eight" accounting firms). Therefore, the supply of CPAs in this market is
not inelastic. Further, these small companies are not subject to the federal securities laws, see
injfa text accompanying note 92, and may not need an audit of their financial statements,
except, for example, to comply with bank loan agreements. In other words, the demand for
audits among many small companies is not inelastic either.
In light of this relative elasticity of the demand for and the supply of audit services
among small privately held corporations, the result of the Rosenblum decision for these small
corporations and the CPA firms that audit them is two-fold. First, for some small clients,
CPA audits are a business necessity. Because of the inelasticity of this demand, CPAs will be
able to pass on some of their initial increases in insurance costs and auditing costs to these
small companies. They will not, however, be able to pass on these costs to the same extent
large firms will be able to pass on costs to their publicly held clients because the supply of
small CPA firms is not as inelastic as the supply of large CPA firms. See infra note 93. Second,
clients that do not require audits but have them performed for management purposes none-
theless may decide to cancel these voluntary audits if CPAs increase their fees. In the alterna-
tive, these companies may subsitute audits with "reviews" or "compilations" of their financial
statements. These two special CPA services require less work and therefore cost less than a
complete audit, but provide less assurance that the financial statements are accurate. There-
fore, it appears that, in practice, the Rosenblum rule will have more of an adverse financial
impact on small and medium sized CPA firms than on large firms.
For a brief discussion of reviews and compilations, see A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, Au-
DITING: AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 742-50 (2d ed. 1980); Comment, Accountants' Liability for
Compilation and Review Engagements, 60 TEx. L. REV. 759 (1982).
92 See Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 345 n.9, 461 A.2d at 149 n.9.
93 Eight large international accounting firms dominate the business of auditing large
publicly held companies. These CPA firms, commonly known as the "Big Eight," are, in
alphabetical order: Arthur Andersen & Co.; Arthur Young & Co.; Coopers & Lybrand;
Deloitte Haskins & Sells; Ernst & Whinney; Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.; Price Waterhouse
& Co.; and Touche Ross & Co. M. STEVENS, THE BIG EIGHT 2 (1981). These eight firms
together employ over 150,000 people in 2,500 offices throughout the world. Id at 8.
"[C]lients of the Big Eight account for 94 percent of all sales, 94 percent of all profits, 90
percent of all income taxes paid, 94 percent of all people employed, and 94 percent of all
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all, of the initial increase in CPA malpractice insurance premiums and
the cost of augmented auditing will be passed from the CPA to the cli-
ent through higher audit fees, as the New Jersey court predicts.
94
Although CPAs will pass the initial increased costs of malpractice
insurance and augmented auditing procedures on to their clients, it is
not clear how CPAs will apportion these costs among those clients. One
possibility is that all audit fees for all clients will increase by a fixed
percent. A more likely outcome is that audit fees will vary with the
degree of risk a client poses of exposing CPAs to liability for negligent
auditing. Clients with unreliable systems of internal control, 95 incompe-
tent accounting and financial personnel,96 and management likely to be
engaged in fraud 9 7 are examples of clients posing great risk to CPAs.
Significant fee increases for these clients will be the result of two
factors. First, to the extent that CPAs will be passing on their increased
malpractice insurance costs, these clients represent the highest insurance
risks, because they are the clients most likely to have materially mis-
stated their financial statements. Second, to the extent that CPAs will
be augmenting the scope of their audit work to reduce the incidence of
negligent auditing, these clients will require the most extensive increase
in auditing procedures because of the weakness of their internal ac-
counting systems, accounting and financial personnel, and
management. 98
Faced with increased CPA audit fees, these risky client companies
will either (1) improve their internal accounting systems, personnel, or
management so that they require less extensive outside auditing, (2) un-
dergo more extensive auditing and pay the increased audit fee, or
(3) forego the independent audit and exit the public capital market.9 9
All three alternatives improve the financial information available in the
marketplace. The first two alternatives result in better prepared, more
assets owned by New York Stock Exchange members." Id See also J. SCHWARTZ, CORPO-
RATE POLICY: A CASEBOOK 216 (1978) ("The need for credibility and the large staffs neces-
sary to audit a major corporation have been the primary factors in the development of a high
degree of concentration in the [accounting] profession.").
94 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
95 For a discussion of internal control, see A. ARENS & J. LOEBBECKE, supra note 16, at
20 & 97.
96 See id. at 161 (auditor must ascertain client's system of internal control; quality of
personnel will in part determine depth and breadth of audit).
97 See id. at 19-20, 89 & 102 (as part of auditor's examination of client's system of inter-
nal control, auditor should account for client's integrity or lack thereof).
98 For a discussion of other factors that affect the nature, timing, and extent of audit
procedures, see generally id. at 88-109. It is also noteworthy that the typical unqualified
auditor's opinion states that the CPA performed "such tests of the accounting records and
such other auditing procedures as [he] considered necessary in the circumstances." See supra note
50 (emphasis added).
99 See supra text accompanying note 92 (discussing annual audit requirement for public
held corporations).
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accurate financial statements, and the last alternative removes less accu-
rate, potentially deceptive financial statements from the capital markets.
Further, because of their inside knowledge of companies' accounting sys-
tems, CPAs are generally in a better position than third parties to iden-
tify risky companies. Therefore, CPAs will not only pass on the initial
increased costs of malpractice insurance and additional auditing to their
clients, as the New Jersey court expects. They will also pass on that cost
in an economically efficient way to those clients most likely to materially
misstate their financial statements.
Once the CPA passes on his increased insurance and auditing costs
to the client via higher audit fees, the extent to which a client company
can in turn pass the increased audit fee on to its customers or stockhold-
ers depends on the elasticity of demand for and supply of its goods or
services. 100 If demand and supply are relatively inelastic, the company
will pass on much of the increased audit fee to its customers through
higher priced products or services. If demand and supply are relatively
elastic, the company will absorb much of the increased audit fee and
indirectly pass the expense on to its stockholders through lower corpo-
rate earnings, dividends, and stock prices. 1 1
The demand and supply for most client-produced goods or services
vary greatly, but seldom are demand and supply perfectly elastic or per-
fectly inelastic. 0 2 Consequently, part of the increased audit fee will
probably be passed on to the client's customers, and part will be passed
on to its stockholders. Ultimately, the initial increase in CPA malprac-
tice insurance premiums and the cost of augmented auditing proce-
dures, resulting from an expanded law of accountants' liability, will be
spread over a large group of people, as the Rosenblum court forecasts. 0 3
Such a result is socially beneficial because it prevents the financial de-
mise of the accounting profession and the concomitant loss of the valua-
ble independent auditing function from the public markets.
Although CPAs will be able to pass along the initial increase in
malpractice premiums resulting from the Rosenblum rule to their clients,
they will still have a significant incentive to perform high quality, non-
negligent audits. Malpractice insurance premiums are based on loss ex-
perience; the greater the frequency and size of an insured's losses, the
higher the insurance premiums and the more difficult it is to obtain
insurance. 10 4 Therefore, a negligent CPA's insurance will cost more
than that of a less negligent CPA. To effectively compete with the less
100 See supra notes 88 & 89 and accompanying text (discussing elasticity).
101 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
102 For a sample of actual demand elasticities for certain goods, see R. LIPSEY & P.
STEINER, supra note 90, at 130-34.
103 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152.
104 See generally Comment, supra note 84.
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negligent CPA, the negligent auditor will have to absorb the extra cost
of his malpractice insurance, thus lowering his profit. The negligent au-
ditor will not be able to pass this noninitial increase in premiums along
to his client. If he attempts to do so, the client will simply hire the less
negligent CPA who, because of his lower insurance costs, will be able to
perform the same audit at a price lower than the negligent CPA. Thus,
there will still be a powerful financial incentive for CPAs to avoid per-
forming negligent audits.
Despite the ability to pass on most, if not all, of the initial increased
cost of insurance to others, CPAs violently object to extending their lia-
bility at common law for negligence to reasonably foreseeable third
party users of financial statements. CPAs claim that their insurance
premiums will skyrocket if they are liable to this new class of potential
plaintiffs.10 5 This concern is overstated because, as noted above, CPAs
will actually bear little, if any, of the initial increase in malpractice in-
surance costs. 1 0 6 Until CPAs can convincingly demonstrate in court
that a rule holding them liable to reasonably foreseeable third parties
will result in their financial demise, courts should follow Rosenblum and
hold CPAs liable to those plaintiffs.
3. Fairness
The court's belief that the negligent CPA rather than the innocent
third party should shoulder the risk of loss due to a negligent audit and
its attendant costs seems sensible on its face, especially because many
third parties, as discussed earlier, t1 7 cannot effectively protect them-
selves from the risk of negligent auditing. In practice, however, innocent
third parties will bear some of the costs of negligent audits because the
increased audit fee resulting from the Rosenblum decision 08 will ulti-
mately be passed on to them.i09
105 See Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 348-49 & n.11, 461 A.2d at 151 & n.11; see also Comment,
supra note 84, at 682-85 (extension of CPA liability to third parties is not prudent due to
increased cost of malpractice insurance that would result from such potential liability).
106 The consensus among legal commentators is that CPAs' fears of financial doom due
to third party liability are unjustified. See Besser, supra note 31, at 534-37 (arguing that insur-
ance is available and that accountants can channel cost of insurance to their clients and
ultimately to consuming public); Solomon, supra note 23, at 89 (noting that accountants will
not have to verify each and every journal entry and that juries have been quite fair to defend-
ant accountants); Wiener, supra note 14, at 252 (holding CPAs liable for their negligent audit-
ing of financial statements injuring third party creditors or investors will not result in dire
economic consequences); Note, Public Accountants, supra note 31, at 605-06 ("The extension of
liability to the full limits of foresecability will not spell the end of the accounting profes-
sion.'). But see Comment, supra note 84 (forecasting elimination of many auditing firms from
marketplace, unproductive increases in auditing costs, abandonment of risky clients, and del-
eterious effects on economy's credit system if accountants' liability is expanded).
107 See supra notes 79-83.
108 See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
109 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
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The apparent inequity in this result may disappear if the increased
fees are viewed as a means available to third parties investing in or loan-
ing money to the audited company of insuring themselves and each
other against losses they may incur if they should become victims of a
negligent audit. The same argument, however, cannot be made with
respect to innocent consumers of the audited company's goods or ser-
vices. These consumers will pay part of the cost of negligent audits
through higher prices for the company's goods or services, 0 but they do
not stand to be financially reimbursed through future recovery against
the CPA, as third party investors and creditors do. To the extent that
the initial increase in auditing fees falls on the unwary consumer, it is
inequitable.
B. The Impact of Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler on the Accounting
Profession
In the future, courts should not read Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler in a
narrow and literal manner that would ignore the sound policy reasons
on which it is based. The Rosenblum decision, when read in a manner
consistent with its underlying policy rationales, will expand the account-
ing profession's liability to third parties in a manner greater than the
New Jersey court's holding implies.
1. The "From the Company" Limitation
The Rosenblum court limited a CPA's potential negligence liability
to only those reasonably foreseeable third parties who rely on financial
statements that they receive directlyfrom the company."' This is the nar-
rowest holding that would permit the Rosenblums to recover because
they had received Giant's financial statements directly from that com-
pany."12 It is understandable that the court proceeded cautiously in ex-
panding CPA liability to reasonably foreseeable third parties; it was the
first court in the United States to so enlarge the scope of accountants'
liability. The "from the company" restriction, however, is arbitrary and
illogical and should be discarded in future cases.
Where it is reasonably foreseeable that a third party will receive
and use the audited financial report, the means by which that party
receives the report should be irrelevant in determining liability. Logi-
cally, if an investor who relies on an audited annual report that he solic-
ited directly from the company is allowed to sue the company's
independent auditor for negligence, an investor who relies on the same
annual report that he received from a business school library, for in-
stance, should not be precluded from doing so. Once the CPA and the
tlO Seeid
M11 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 352, 461 A.2d at 153 (emphasis added).
112 Id at 330, 461 A.2d at 141.
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company "[insert] the audit in [the] economic stream," 113 each investor
described above should be allowed to sue a negligent CPA. Any other
conclusion would hinder furtherance of the policies behind Rosenblum
because certain reasonably foreseeable third parties would be able to
recover from a negligent CPA, while others would not. 114 The liability
of a CPA to third parties who do not receive financial statements di-
rectly from the company, however, remains undecided in New Jersey
after Rosenblum.
2. Reliance "on the Financial Statements"
The Rosenblums actually possessed and relied on Giant's financial
statements. The court, therefore, did not consider whether third parties
who buy a company's securities relying only on the quoted national
market price of the securities and not on the company's financial state-
ments would be able to recover against a negligent CPA. Theoretically,
the market price for a company's securities is based on information con-
tained in that company's audited financial statements.'1 5 Further, even
though the market may account for the possibility that financial state-
ments are materially misstated,"16 the market generally assumes that
those audited statements correctly and fairly present the company's fi-
nancial condition and operating results. 1 7 If the underlying financial
statements are, in fact, materially misstated, the price of the company's
securities will not reflect the true value of the security. Therefore, when
a purchaser or seller of a company's securities relies on the market price
of that security in making an investment decision, he indirectly relies
"on the financial statements" of that company. 1 8
113 Id. at 356, 461 A.2d at 155.
114 Neither the Wisconsin court in Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113
Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983), discussed supra note 15, nor the English court in JEB
Fasterners v. Mark, Bloom & Co., [1981] 3 All E.R. 289 (Q.B.), aj'd, [1983] 1 All E.R. 583
(C.A), discussed supra note 2, adopted "from the company" language when expanding CPA
liability.
115 SeeT. DYCKMAN, D. DOWNES & R. MAGEE, supra note 76, at 86-94 (accounting infor-
mation reflected in security prices); M. FIRTH, supra note 76, at 140-54 (new information
should cause an immediate reaction in share prices).
116 See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the "efficient market"
theory).
117 M. FIRTH, supra note 76, at 140 (efficient market theory posits that information is
"instantaneously reflected" in share prices; this assertion suggests that market relies on ac-
counting information).
118 This theory was first articulated in Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). The court of appeals said:
A purchaser on the stock exchanges ... relies generally on the supposition
that the market price is validly set and that no unsuspected manipulation has
artificially inflated the price, and thus indirectly on the truth of the represen-
tations underlying the stock price-whether he is aware of it or not, the price
he pays reflects material misrepresentations. Requiring direct proof from
each purchaser that he relied on a particular representation when purchasing
would defeat recovery by those whose reliance was indirect, despite the fact
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In future cases, if the New Jersey court requires a showing that each
particular plaintiff has read the financial statements audited by the de-
fendant CPA and relied upon them in purchasing his securities, it will
raise "essentially the same problems as a requirement of privity, al-
though the persons who could sue might be different and possibly more
numerous."" t9 Although institutional investors may frequently read
and rely on financial statements in making investment decisions, many
smaller investors may invest without relying on financial statements.
These smaller investors may base their investment decisions on nothing
more than general economic trends and expectations, a company's gen-
eral business reputation and stability, or confidence in a company's
products and services. If, however, the New Jersey court allows plain-
tiffs who rely only on market prices to recover from the CPA, "that
would seem to be equivalent to saying that reliance [by] the plaintiff is
not required at all."' 20
Of course, the degree of reliance that plaintiffs must prove will sig-
nificantly affect the success or failure of future cases against negligent
CPAs. 121 It is unclear which path the New Jersey court, or any other
court adopting the Rosenblum rule, will follow when confronted with the
issue of reliance. Because the overriding theme of the Rosenblum rule was
to discard the privity requirement of Ultramares and because "the same
problems. . . of privity"'122 will exist if direct reliance on the company's
financial statements is required, courts following Rosenblum and its pub-
lic policies may eventually adopt a rule extending CPA liability to third
parties relying on market prices alone.
3. Proximate Cause
The Rosenblum court properly followed traditional tort law when it
limited a plaintiff's recovery to those damages proximately caused by
the auditor's negligence.' 23 In the case of a third party investor, for ex-
that the causational chain is broken only if the purchaser would have
purchased the stock even had he known of the misrepresentation.
524 F.2d at 907. This case was decided under federal securities law, but the theory can be
adopted in state negligence claims against CPAs. Even under this theory, however, the plain-
tiff is required to show what effect the misstatement or nondisclosure had on the stock price.
R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1051 (1982).
119 R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 118, at 1051.
120 Id.
121 This Note does not analyze in detail the issue of reliance on market prices alone or
conclude whether courts should or should not adopt a rule extending CPA liability to third
parties relying on market prices alone. This section merely presents an issue that courts will
have to confront in future cases and discusses how courts may resolve that issue.
122 R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 118, at 1051.
123 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 350, 461 A.2d at 152. For a discussion of a case where a negli-
gent CPA was held not liable to a plaintiff because of a lack of proximate cause, see supra note
2. For a comprehensive discussion of proximate cause, see W. PROSSER, supra note 27, at 236-
90.
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ample, even if financial statements contain a material misrepresenta-
tion, the investor should not and will not be able to recover from a CPA
if the real cause of his security's price decline is a general stock market
decline, precipitated by unrelated events such as a political assassination
or a military invasion in some remote part of the world. 124 This tradi-
tional proximate cause requirement will not affect Rosenblum's impact on
the accounting profession in any unusual way.
4. Plaintiffs Coniribulog Negh'gence
As in most other areas of negligence law, the plaintiffs contributory
negligence may completely or partially bar his recovery against a negli-
gent CPA. 2 5 For example, a reasonably foreseeable third party user of
financial statements may be negligent if the third party relies on the
CPA's unqualified opinion when, through his own investigation of or
discussions with the client company, he knows that the financial state-
ments are inaccurate. Also, in a very large transaction such as a merger,
the third party may be negligent if he does not obtain a representation
directly from the CPA that the financial statements are accurate. 26
Further, a third party user of financial statements may be negligent if he
relies on statements that do not carry an unqualified opinion by the
CPA, but rather carry an adverse opinion, a qualified opinion, or a dis-
claimer of opinion.127
The extent to which a plaintiffs own negligence abates his recovery
against a negligent CPA depends on the contributory negligence or
comparative negligence laws of individual states. 28 In a state with a
traditional contributory negligence statute, a plaintiffs contributory
negligence will completely bar his recovery against the CPA. 129 In a
state with some form of comparative negligence statute, the negligent
plaintiff's recovery may be reduced by the amount he is determined to
124 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 202(19)
comment (4)(c) (1978), reprinted in R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 118, at 1043.
125 See W. PROSSER, supra note 27, at 416-27.
126 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
127 See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text for a discussion of these other types of
auditors' opinions.
128 New Jersey has a Comparative Negligence Act, NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West
Supp. 1983), which eliminates contributory negligence as a bar to recovery provided the neg-
ligence of the person seeking recovery is not greater than the negligence of the person from
whom recovery is sought or combined negligence of the persons from whom recovery is
sought. For an analysis of the various types of comparative negligence statutes in American
states and for a current listing of states with comparative negligence statutes, see Note, Com-
parative Negligence, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1668 (1981). At least 25 states currently have some
form of comparative negligence statutes. See C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 429 & n.6 (3d ed. 1977) (listing states with comparative negli-
gence statutes).
129 See W. PROSSER, supra note 27, at 416-27.
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have contributed to his own loss. 1 30 As states continue to move away
from strict contributory negligence statutes towards more liberal com-
parative negligence statutes,' 31 negligent CPAs will become liable for
damages awards more frequently. Thus, this "built-in limitation"' 3 2 on
CPAs' financial exposure due to their expanded liability to third parties
will be eroded over time.
5. Client Indemnification or Contribution
Theoretically, the court is correct in stating that a negligent ac-
countant can seek indemnification or contribution from a client com-
pany or its employees if those employees also contributed to the
plaintiff's loss through negligent or fraudulent preparation of the com-
pany's financial statements. 133 The effectiveness of this remedy, how-
ever, is dubious. Client companies and their employees often are
judgment proof due to their poor financial condition. That is precisely
why injured plaintiffs sue the "deep pocket" CPAs in the first place.'34
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the remote possibility of client indem-
nification will significantly limit CPAs' financial exposure due to their
expanded liability.
CONCLUSION
In extending the common law liability of CPAs for negligent audit-
ing of financial statements to certain reasonably foreseeable third party
users of the statements, the New Jersey Supreme Court has taken the
crucial step in rejecting the antiquated privity doctrine embodied in the
Ultramares decision. The Rosenblum decision brings CPA liability up to
date with generally accepted tort law principles of duty based on
"foreseeability."
This modern theory of CPA liability to third party users of finan-
cial statements is a prudent expansion of prior law and is based on
sound public policy. As between CPAs and those third parties, CPAs
are the least-cost avoiders of the costs associated with negligent auditing.
Further, the Rosenblum rule poses no threat to the financial integrity of
the accounting profession because any initial costs imposed on the pro-
130 See id at 433-39.
131 See id at 418 ("[The defense of contributory negligence has gradually come to be
looked upon with increasing disfavor by the courts.") (footnote omitted); see also C. GREGORY,
H. KALVEN & R. EPSTEIN, supra note 128, at 433 ("[COomparative negligence has met with
widespread favor. . . in recent years. .. 2).
132 See supra notes 67 & 72 and accompanying text.
133 Rosenblum, 93 N.J. 351, 461 A.2d 152.
134 See Besser, supra note 31, at 507 n.2 (noting significant increase in numbers of lawsuits
against accountants); Volz, supra note 23, at 33 (pointing out that accounting firm may be
only negligent party from whom an injured party may recover); Note, supra note 12, at 289
n.57 (plaintiffs normally sue accountants only when company is insolvent, rendering right to
indemnity from that company is valueless).
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fession by the rule can be spread to its clients. This cost-spreading will
occur in an economically efficient manner as the CPAs will charge
higher audit fees to those clients who are most likely to materially mis-
state their financial statements.
Given the sound policy reasons on which the Rosenblum rule is
based, other state courts should not hesitate to follow it.135 In reading
the Rosenblum opinion, however, other courts must take care to avoid
ascribing a narrow and literal meaning to its language that would ig-
nore these sound policy reasons and retard the development of the law
in this area.
William J. Casazza
135 See supra note 15.
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